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THE CATHOLIC LAWYER
RECENT DECISIONS
Divorce
In the recent case of Golden v. Arons,'
the Superior Court of New Jersey held that,
under some circumstances, differences in
religious faith may create valid grounds for
divorce. The Jewish wife was successful in
obtaining a divorce on the ground of ex-
treme cruelty, where she was able to show
that after her husband had left the Jewish
faith to become a Catholic, he attempted to
force her conversion by insulting her, be-
littling her religious practices, attempting to
cut off all her relationships with members of
her own religion, and continually discussing
religion.
A month earlier, a separation was
granted to a husband in New York, when
his wife, who had been converted to a
Christian denomination, refused to live at
the address chosen by her Jewish husband,
insisted on choosing the family residence,
claimed money as her own deposited for
her by her husband, and unjustifiably caused
a Magistrate's Court summons to be issued
against him. 2
In both cases, the courts reaffirmed the
fundamental rule that differences in reli-
gious belief or affiliation are not in them-
selves grounds for divorce or separation,
and that conversion to another religion, in
a land of liberty, cannot in itself be a
ground for divorce or separation. How-
ever, the holdings in these cases are based
on the equally well recognized principle
that religious motives may -induce acts
which are in themselves legal grounds for
divorce or separation.
1 36 N.J. Super. 371, 115 A. 2d 639 (1955).
2 Booke v. Booke, 207 Misc. 999, 141 N.Y.S. 2d
580 (Sup. Ct. 1955).
These cases are consistent with the
traditional view that the problem is one of
distinguishing between situations where a
plaintiff wishes a divorce only because of
difference of religious viewpoint with his
spouse, and those cases where he seeks
divorce for acts motivated by a differ-
ence in belief and which constitute valid
grounds under the statutes of a particular
jurdisdiction.3
In practice however, it has been neces-
sary to apply these principles to cases
where the religious doctrine to which a
spouse adheres calls for, or at least the
spouse believes it calls for, the acts which
are thought objectionable. In Smith v.
Smith,4 the wife became a Jehovah Wit-
ness and travelled to distant cities with her
children, distributing literature and living
on charity. The husband was granted a
divorce on grounds of extreme cruelty.
Generally, the rule seems to be that in
actions for divorce or separation the acts
themselves will be considered by the court,
regardless of the motives which spawned
them. The acts are to be measured against
the statutory grounds for divorce and
separation which of course differ from
jurisdiction to jurisdiction, and the deci-
sion is to be based on that consideration
alone. In no case can a difference of opinion
on matters of religion, any more than a
difference of opinon on political matters,
be sufficient for divorce and separation, if
3 See Mertens v. Mertens, 38 Wash. 2d 55, 227
P. 2d 724 (1951); Smith v. Smith, 61 Ariz. 373,
149 P. 2d 683 (1944); Krauss v. Krauss, 163 La.
218, 111 So. 683 (1927); Trautman v. Krauss,
159 La. 371, 105 So. 376 (1925).
4 61 Ariz. 373, 149 P. 2d.683 (1944).
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it is not coupled with something more.5
The constitutional guarantee of religious
liberty would bar the court from granting
divorces for religious differences alone,
but of course, not for acts that otherwise,
regardless of religious motives, would be
good grounds for divorce.6
It is clear that if a husband wishes to
divorce his wife because she belongs to
another religion, he will not succeed. It is
equally clear that in a jurisdiction where
cruelty is a ground for divorce, if a husband
should beat his wife every day because she
is a member of some sect, his wife will have
an excellent cause of action for divorce.
But interest in this problem lies in the area
between these extremes, so far devoid of
much litigation, where acts springing from
high religious and ethical standards, done
in the best of faith by one spouse in a mixed
marriage, might seem like cruelty to the
other.
Sunday Laws
The defendant was arrested for violating
section 2147 of the Penal Law by selling
a book on a Sunday evening in his store,
located in the heart of New York City's
amusement district. People v. Law, 142
N. Y. S. 2d 440 (1955). Subdivision 4 of
Section 2147 prohibits the public sale or
offering for sale of any property on Sunday,
except:
Prepared tobacco, bread, milk, eggs, ice,
soda water, fruit, flowers, confectionery,
souvenirs, newspapers, magazines, gasoline,
oil, tires, drugs, medicine, and surgical
instruments. . ..
5 See Donaldson v. Donaldson, 38 Wash. 2d 748,
231 P. 2d 607 (1951).
6 Krauss v. Krauss, 163 La. 218, li1 So. 683
(1927). (dictum).
Although the book which was the sub-
ject of the sale was not one of those articles
specifically excepted from the general pro-
hibition, the court found that since the
sale itself constituted no serious interrup-
tion of the repose and religious liberty of
the community, section 2147 did not apply.
In reaching this decision emphasis was
placed upon the locality where the alleged
violation took place. The court noted that
most people who frequent that particular
neighborhood do so in quest of amuse-
ment and relaxation rather than religious
observance.
This decision is significant as a departure
from the traditional interpretation the courts
have placed upon "Sunday laws." The tend-
ency, heretofore, has been to construe such
statutes liberally in favor of protecting the
Sabbath.I In the present case, the complaint
was dismissed on the grounds that the
alleged sale was not within the prohibition
intended by the legislature. The court stated
that section 2147 must be construed in
conjunction with section 2140 "The basic
section of the statue.., which is plainly
explanatory of the meaning of ... [the]
section." Section 2140 reads, in part, as
follows:
... the law prohibits the doing on that day
[the Sabbath] of certain acts hereinafter
specified, which are serious interruptions of
the repose and religious liberty of the
community.
"Sunday laws" have a dual purpose; first,
to protect the religious observance of the
community from interference; and, second,
to offer working people a compulsory day
of rest and relaxation. Such legislation has
been justified as an exercise of police power
I People ex rel. Moffatt v. Zimmerman, 48 Misc.
203, 95 N.Y. Supp. 136 (Sup. Ct. 1904).
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in protecting the morality and general wel-
fare of its citizens.2
In People ex rel. Moffatt v. Zimmerman,3
an earlier New York decision treating of the
"Sunday laws," the court stated:
It is the selling and offering for sale of
any articles of merchandise that constitutes
the offense, and not the character of the
article, unless it is among the exceptions to
the act. [Emphasis supplied.]
It is apparent that in the instant case, the
sale of books was not expressly excepted
from the prohibition of which the court took
cognizance. This sale, judged in the light of
the language in the Moffatt case might well
have been held to be within the scope of the
statute and thereby proscribed.
In People v. Moses,4 the defendant was
arrested for violating former Penal Code
section 265 prohibiting fishing on Sunday.
The defendant contended that he was fishing
on private property and did not interfere
with the repose and religious liberty of the
community. The court, in affirming the deci-
sion of the lower court finding the defendant
guilty, refuted his contention. The court
said:
It is not the meaning of this section that
every act which is claimed to be a violation
thereof must, in fact, be a serious interrup-
tion of the repose and religious liberty of
the community; but the legislature ... speci-
fied certain acts which are declared to be
serious interruptions of the repose and
religious liberty of the community-acts
necessarily described in general and com-
2 United Vaudeville Co. v. Zeller, 58 Misc. 16, 108
N.Y. Supp. 789 (Sup. Ct. 1908); Am. Jur. pp.
805, 808-09.
3 People ex rel. Moffatt v. Zimmerman, supra note
1, at 205, 95 N.Y. Supp. at 137.
4 140 N.Y. 214, 35 N.E. 499 (1893).
prehensive terms .... It is quite unreason-
able to suppose that the legislature meant
that whenever any of these acts are charged
... an issue can be framed and tried as to
their public, offensive or disturbing char-
acter. The legislature has settled that matter
by prohibiting them absolutely. 5
The language in the Moses case would
seem to rebut any defense based upon the
locality or nature of the neighborhood in
which the sale was perpetrated. Since the
legislature is the only competent body to
declare which acts interfere with the repose
and religious liberty of the community, and
since it appears from the express wording
of the statute that all sales of merchandise
except those enumerated were deemed ob-
jectionable, the decision in the instant case
would appear to be an attempt at judicial
legislation.
This conclusion is bolstered by the deci-
sion in People v. Gill,6 wherein the defend-
ant contended that the washing of cars on
Sunday was a work of necessity and there-
fore exempt from the statute prohibiting
labor on Sunday. The court, after finding
that the washing of cars was not a work of
necessity, stated that if the defendant were
of the opinion that the prohibition was
illogical, recourse to the legislature to
change the law was available.
Freedom of the Press
The Supreme Court of New York re-
cently upheld the constitutionality of a state
law which enables certain specified officials
to obtain an injunction preventing the dis-
tribution, selling or acquiring possession of
obscene materials and to obtain an order
5 Id., at pp. 215-16.
6 206 Misc. 585, 134 N.Y.S. 2d 622 (Magis. Ct.
1954).
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directing the surrender of the materials to
the Sheriff, who is to seize and destroy
them. Burke v. Kingsley Books, Inc., 208
Misc. 150, 142 N.Y.S. 2d 735 (Sup. Ct.
1955). The Corporation Counsel brought
an action under section 22-a of the Code of
Criminal Procedure1 to enjoin the defend-
ant from circulating a book entitled NIGHTS
OF HORROR. The court in granting the in-
junction, felt constrained to discuss the vari-
ous contentions in some detail because of
the constitutional questions involved.
In finding that the booklets comprising
NIGHTS OF HORROR were "obscene" within
the meaning of the section, the court de-
scribed the material as "lustful and vicious
concupiscence," that would ".... invite crime
and voluptuousness, and excite lecherous
desires.... The publications have libidinous
effect upon ordinary, normal, healthy per-
sons; their effect upon the abnormal indi-
vidual may be disastrous to him as to others
as well." The court further noted "That
there is no attempt to achieve any literary
standard is obvious. The volumes are replete
with misspelled words, typographical errors,
faulty grammar, misplaced pages and gen-
erally poor workmanship."' 2
The defendants contended, among other
things, that the statute violated the constitu-
tional protection against unreasonable sei-
zures and was also an unconstitutional
restraint on freedom of the press as set forth
in the First Amendment to the Federal
Constitution and section 8, article I of the
Constitution of the State of New York.
With respect to the objection that the
1 Laws of N.Y. 1941, c. 925, §2, as amended,
Laws of N.Y. 1954, C. 702.
2 Burke v. Kingsley Books, Inc., 208 Misc. 150,
158, 142 N.Y.S. 2d 735, 741-42 (Sup. Ct. 1955).
action involved a violation of the constitu-
tional safeguard against unreasonable sei-
zures, the court held that the key word was
unreasonable. Citizens are not immune from
reasonable searches and seizures.3 The
order of seizure in the present case was
preceded by due notice and a fair and
speedy trial.4 Moreover, the materials were
subject to seizure under an alternative
theory, i.e., that the legislature had made
them contraband. 5 Contraband is a public
nuisance and as such can be abated. 6
In light of developments within the last
few years, defendant's objection that section
22-a was an unconstitutional restraint on
freedom of the press guaranteed in the First
Amendment to the Federal Constitution,
posed serious questions. There is no doubt
that the safeguards of the First Amendment
are applicable to the states by reason of
the Fourteenth Amendment's due process
3 People v. Chiagles, 237 N.Y. 193, 142 N.E. 583
(1923); People v. Richter's Jewelers, Inc., 265
App. Div. 767, 771, 40 N.Y.S. 2d 751, 754 (1st
Dep't) (dictum), aft'd, 291 N.Y. 161, 51 N.E. 2d
690 (1943).
4 "The person, firm or corporation sought to be
enjoined shall be entitled to a trial of the issues
within one day after joinder of issue and a decision
shall be rendered by the court within two days of
the conclusion of the trial." N.Y. Code Crim.
Proc. §22-a(3).
5 ".... [Sluch final order of judgment shall contain
a provision directing the person, firm or corpora-
tion to surrender to the sheriff of the county in
which the action was brought any of the matter
described ... and such sheriff shall be directed to
seize and destroy the same." N.Y. Code Crim.
Proc. §22-a(3).
6Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133, 140 (1894);
People v. Whitcomb, 273 App. Div. 610, 79 N.Y.S.
2d 230 (4th Dep't), appeal dismissed, 298 N.Y.
635, 82 N.E. 2d 30 (1948); People v. Defore, 242
N.Y. 13, 150 N.E. 585 (1926) (dictum), cert.
denied, 270 U.S. 657. See N.Y. Penal Law
§§982-85, 1899.
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clause. 7 However, it must be pointed out, it
is just as well settled that an abuse of basic
human liberties may be prevented by the
proper exercise of the police power if there
is a clear and present danger and the action
taken is designed to relieve it.8 In view of
the recent hearings of the Special United
States Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on
Juvenile Delinquency and the Select Com-
mittee of the United States House of Repre-
sentatives on Current Pornographic Mate-
rials, it cannot be seriously questioned that
the book seized herein presents a "clear and
present danger." In upholding the constitu-
tionality of section 22-a, the court neces-
sarily held that the term "obscene" was
sufficiently definite to serve as a standard of
prohibition. In this regard it is interesting to
compare section 122 of the New York State
Education Law which specifies films which
may not be given licenses. This law has
undergone a stormy period in the last three
years. 9 Two of its provisions have been
found unconstitutional. In the case of
Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S.
495 (1952), the Supreme Court held that
motion pictures are within the ambit of
protection which the First Amendment
through the Fourteenth secures to "speech"
and "the press," and that the standard
7 Grosjean v. American Press Co., Inc., 297 U.S.
233 (1936); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697
(1931); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652
(1925).
8 Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951);
Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919);
Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133 (1894); Thornhill
v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 105 (1940) (dictum).
9 For a comment on the New York Motion Pic-
ture Censorship Law, see 1 THE CATHOLIC LAW-
YER 58 (Jan. 1955).
"sacrilegious" is so vague and indefinite as
to violate the due process clause. The sec-
ond provision of the statute found to be
unconstitutional for the same reasons as
set forth in the Burstyn case, was the re-
fusal to license an "immoral" picture. 1°
Subsequently, a new section which defined
the terms used in section 122, 122-a was
added to the Education Law."
It should be noted that the New York
Motion Picture Censorship Law has not
been declared unconstitutional because of
any vagueness or indefiniteness in the use
of the term "obscene." In fact, the opinion
in the Burstyn case specifically referred to
the fact that the Supreme Court was not
holding censorship of an "obscene" motion
picture to be unconstitutional. 12 The term
"obscene" has always been considered suffi-
ciently definite to meet constitutional re-
quirements. 13 In this connection, it should
be observed that subsequent to the Burstyn
case, the Supreme Court of Illinois upheld
the right of the City of Chicago to ban a
film on the ground that it is "obscene."' 14
Ironically, the film was "The Miracle," the
same film which New York unsuccessfully
attempted to ban on the ground that it Was
sacrilegious.
10 Commercial Pictures Corp. v. Board of Re-
gents, 346 U.S. 587 (1954).
11 Laws of N.Y. 1954, c. 620.
12 Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495,
505-06.
13 Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 518
(1948) (dictum); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,
315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942) (dictum); People v.
Muller, 96 N.Y. 408 (1884).
14 American Civil Liberties Union v. City of Chi-
cago, 3 111. 2d 334, 121 N.E. 2d 585 (1954).
